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Abstract—As one of the classic models that describe the belief
dynamics over social networks, non-Bayesian social learning
model assumes that members in the network possess accurate
signal knowledge through the process of Bayesian inference. In
order to make the non-Bayesian social learning model more ap-
plicable to human and animal societies, this paper extended this
model by assuming the existence of private signal structure bias:
each social member in each time step uses an imperfect signal
knowledge to form its Bayesian part belief, then incorporates
its neighbors’ beliefs into this Bayesian part belief to form a
new belief report. First, we investigated the intrinsic learning
ability of an isolated agent and deduced the conditions that the
signal structure needs to satisfy for this isolated agent to make an
eventually correct decision. According to these conditions, agents’
signal structures were further divided into three different types,
”conservative,” ”radical,” and ”negative”. Then we switched
the context from isolated agents to a connected network, our
propositions and simulations show the conservative agents are
the dominant force for the social network to learn the real
state, while the other two types might prevent the network from
successful learning. Although fragilities do exist in non-Bayesian
social learning mechanism, ”be more conservative” and ”avoid
overconfidence” could be effective strategies for each agent in
the real social networks to collectively improve social learning
processes and results.
I. INTRODUCTION
LEARNING the truth of the world from signals we ob-served and information provided by others is an essential
part of our daily social life. For most of the time, we hope
that our decisions, beliefs, and opinions about the objective
world could become more and more precise with the infor-
mation provided by our social neighbors, especially when our
knowledge is inaccurate or inadequate to deal with what we
observed. What is the mechanism by which individuals use
social connections to form beliefs and make decisions? It is
one of the key questions that various social learning models
try to answer [1]–[5].
The non-Bayesian social learning model proposed in [6] is
a model that describes the belief dynamics over the social
network. In this model, each agent of the finite network
receives discrete time signal inputs from the objective world
and generate discrete time belief outputs. Specifically, in each
discrete time step, two information sources are used to update
an agent’s belief. One information source is the individual
information source, which includes agent’s belief report at the
last time step and its newly observed signal, the agent uses
this information source to form its personal belief through
Bayesian inference. Another information source is the social
information source, which includes the last time step belief
reports of all its neighbors. At the end of the new time step,
each agent’s new belief report is a convex combination of
the personal belief and neighbors’ beliefs. The non-Bayesian
social learning model applies well to real social networks,
because it takes factors from social, psychological, physical
and cognitive aspects into account, these factors include (1)
forgetting mechanism, (2) communication, (3) individual’s
naive style to aggregate information, (4) individual’s Bayesian
style to make decisions, and (5) individuals are incapable of
engaging in fully rational learning. Along with the model,
the authors in [6] give sufficient conditions for a network
to eventually and collectively learn the world’s actual state.
Their results show that naive information aggregation rule can
achieve successful learning, even agents in the network are
unaware of important aspects like the network topology and
signal structure of other agents.
One default assumption of the model of [6] is that, in order
to form the individual part belief in each time step, each agent
must perform Bayesian inference based on signal statistical
models about all possible states. Each agent’s signal spaces
and signal statistical models about possible states may vary
from each other, but it assumes that everyone in the network
possesses the accurate signal statistical model about the real
state.
However, in many social contexts, this ideal and harsh
condition cannot be met: While network members are unaware
of the actual state of the world, they may also use inaccurate
knowledge to make Bayesian inference. There are many rea-
sons for this, such as lacking precise knowledge, personality,
attitudes, preferences, and so on. Therefore, it is necessary to
extend the non-Bayesian social learning model by considering
this imperfect signal knowledge assumption. Based on the non-
ideal assumption that each agent possesses an imperfect private
signal structure, the mathematical contributions of our work
are listed as follows:
1. For an isolated agent, we show that different signal struc-
ture conditions ensure different types of asymptotic learning
(Proposition 1 convergence in probability and Proposition 2 al-
most sure convergence). Accordingly, agents’ signal structures
are further divided into three different types, conservative,
radical and negative.
2. In the network context, we show that individual almost
sure convergence could lead to collective almost sure conver-
gence (Proposition 3). Counter-intuitively, we show individual
convergence in probability does not guarantee collective con-
vergence in any sense (Proposition 4).
3. We show that in the imperfect signal structure scenario,
there is an approximately linear relationship between learning
speed and property of signal structure (Proposition 5).
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2Based on the above mathematical and simulation results,
in Section VI, we find some mathematical fragilities in non-
Bayesian social learning mechanism. We further explain the
mathematically fragile yet practically effective social learning
mechanism by introducing some realistic assumptions into the
ideal model, such as to give self-reliance a meaning of self-
confidence and allow agents to adjust their signal structures
with the change of social pressure. With these assumptions,
we propose signal structure adjusting strategies by which the
individuals could collectively improve the learning of the
network. At last, some typical decision-making patterns are
extracted based on these adjusting strategies. These decision-
making patterns match not only private signal structure types
but also people’s decision-making styles, which also reveals
the implementation value of our work.
Our propositions, numerical simulations, analyses, and con-
clusions could inspire the in-depth understanding of how
different types of members influence the evolution of beliefs
in real life social networks.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
Social learning in microeconomics studies is sequential, or
in an expanding topology [7]–[9]. In [8], the authors interpret
the ”wisdom of crowd” in an expanding network mathemati-
cally, showing the group intelligence is a network version of
the law of large numbers. In [9], the authors discussed the
learning problem in a sequential social learning model, where
the newly joined node could make rational decisions based on
a signal and some predecessors’ decisions.
The non-Bayesian social learning model we adopt in this
paper is a type of DeGroot-style learning [10], which allows
agents in the network to merge neighbors’ opinions in a
weighted averaging approach in each time step. Compared
with sequential learning, DeGroot model based on Markov
chain theory provides a system perspective to understand
social learning. In empirical research [11], it is verified that
DeGroot model could well describe the opinion dynamics
in a social network. DeGroot model is the foundation of
many following social learning models [12], [13]. In [12], the
authors model the opinion dynamics of the social network
from the angle of the control system with defined inputs
and discrete time opinion outputs. Model in [13] introduces
Bayesian inference into the network; each agent in the network
receives a signal at the beginning, then repeatedly, it observes
its neighbors’ actions and makes fully rational decisions. In
subsequent research [14], the authors conducted a series of
experiments to validate this Bayesian learning model within a
three-person network. One common feature of above studies
and non-Bayesian social learning model [6] is that they are all
social physics model researches targeting human and animal
social networks, which means the nodes in networks are
assumed to be social members, and edges in the network are
assumed to be social connections.
In this paper, we adopt the non-Bayesian social learning
model in [6], which uses static topology, naive information
aggregation rule, Bayesian self-renewal and allows constant
arrival of new signals. Compared with sequential learning with
expanding topologies, the non-Bayesian social learning model
is more like a dynamic system with discrete and distributed
signal inputs and belief outputs. Our work is closely related
to the researches on extensions or variations of non-Bayesian
social learning model, such as [15]–[19]. Some of them focus
on variations of learning rule, such as in [15] the authors bridge
the gap between different information aggregation rules, and
traits of different learning rules are discussed. In [16], the
authors conducted a comprehensive comparison of different
learning rules. In [17], the authors consider a scenario where
each agent’s signal structure about the underlying state may be
not the actual distribution of signal, which is very similar to
our imperfect signal structure scenario; a difference between
their work and ours is that our work adopts a naive information
aggregation rule that applies to human and animal social
networks, while their work applies better to computer decision-
making systems (we discuss the effects of different learning
rules in Section V). In [18], the authors define the speed of
learning, give it an analytical form of bounds, uncover the
relationship between signal structure, network topology, and
network’s learning speed; in our work, we investigate the
learning speed problem under our assumptions.
In addition to these model extensions and variations, studies
on the characteristics and performance of non-Bayesian social
learning are also relevent to our work, such as [20]–[24]. In
[21], the performance (learning speed) of non-Bayesian social
learning is discussed in a gaming model. In [20] the authors
introduce a confidence radius into non-Bayesian social learn-
ing model and demonstrate a clustering phenomenon in their
model, their analysis approach for the roles played by different
types of agents is similar to our work. In [22], information
cascades phenomena in social learning models (including the
non-Bayesian social learning model) are discussed in detail.
Our work is also inspired by social science studies which
reveal inefficiencies or fragilities of social learning, such as
[25]–[27]. In [25] information cascades and overconfidence
are presented and discussed in a strictly designed experiment.
In [26], the authors use a series of experiments to demonstrate
and analyze statistical, social and psychological effects that
ruin the wisdom of crowd. In [27], the author reveals the echo
chamber effect of social learning and offers advises about how
to avoid it. Besides, in [28] the authors discuss the participants’
decision-making features in imperfect signal structure scenario
via well-designed experiments, which is similar to the scene
in our work. Compared with these quantitative and qualitative
studies, our work tends to give mathematical explanations for
observational learning and collective decision-making in social
networks and to reveal insights of social learning mechanism
that are difficult to reveal by empirical studies.
III. MODEL, ASSUMPTIONS AND MAIN QUESTION
We consider a finite set V = {1, 2, . . . , N} containing
N agents interacting over a social network, which could be
represented by a directed graph G = (V,E). The element
(i, j) in the edge set E represents a directed edge connecting
agent i to agent j, which captures the fact that agent j has
access to the belief held by agent i. For each agent i, define
3Ni = {j ∈ V : (j, i) ∈ E}, called agent i’s neighbor set.
Elements in set Ni are agents whose beliefs are available to
agent i. Agent i is isolated if Ni = Φ, which means this agent
has no neighbors. A directed path in G = (V,E) from agent
i to agent j is a sequence of agents starting with i and ending
with j such that each agent is a neighbor of the next agent in
the sequence. The social network would be strongly connected
if there is at least one directed path from each agent to any
other agents.
We write Mi· and M·j to denote the i-th row and j-th
column of a matrix M . M is stochastic if its entries are non-
negative and the sum of entries in each row is equal to 1. We
define |Θ| as the cardinality of a set Θ, ∆Θ as the distribution
over set Θ. Transpose of vector v is denoted by vT . When we
take the logarithm of a vector, we mean taking the logarithm
of the vector entry-wise.
A. World Signal Structure
Let θ denote a possible state of the objective world,
representing an underlying reason for a social or natural
phenomenon; all possible states constitute a finite state set
Θ. The real state is the actual fact, denoted by θr, θr ∈ Θ,
which in this paper is predefined and static over time. Though
the actual state of the world remains unobservable to the
individuals, agents in the network keep making repeated noisy
observations about θr over discrete time. For each agent i, at
the beginning of each time period t ≥ 1, a signal ωi,t ∈ Si
drawn according to distribution gi ∈ ∆Si is observed by agent
i, here Si denotes agent i’s signal space. In this paper, all
impossible signals are excluded from Si, which means all
entries in gi are strictly positive. For the reason that signal
distribution gi is the world signal’s statistical distribution based
on the underlying state θr, we name gi the world signal
structure. Besides, we assume that both gi and Si may vary
across agents but keep static over time.
B. Belief and Private Signal Structure
An agent’s belief is the extent to which it believes a state is
real. An agent’s beliefs on all possible states constitute a belief
profile. Belief profile is dynamic over time and varies across
agents; thus we could use column vector µi,t to denote agent
i’s belief profile. Since belief profile is a distribution over state
set Θ, we have µi,t ∈ ∆Θ. In addition, we use µi,t(θm) to
denote agent i’s belief on a specific state θm at time t.
Agent i’s private signal structure is its statistical knowledge
about the signals with respect to all possible states. In the non-
Bayesian social learning model, the private signal structure is
used to make Bayesian inference. The private signal structure
can be represented by a |Si| × |Θ| signal-state likelihood
mapping
Li =
[
`1i , `
2
i , · · · , `mi , · · ·
]
.
The m-th column entry `mi of Li is the possibility all signals
attributed to θm from the view of agent i. For private signal
structure, it must satisfy that `mi ∈ ∆Si for all m, which also
indicates that the transpose of the matrix Li is stochastic.
Since signal space Si is a local property and state space
Θ is defined globally, private signal structures of different
agents may have different numbers of rows, but share the same
number of columns.
When `ri = g
T
i , which is an ideal assumption indicating that
each agent possesses the accurate signal knowledge, it is the
scenario that has been discussed in [6]. Our work extends this
ideal assumption and allows for the private signal structure
bias.
Assumption 1. Each agent’s knowledge about the statistical
model of the real state may be imperfect, which means for each
agent’s private signal structure, it may satisfy that `ri 6= gTi .
In real social networks, noises, which ruins the perfectness
of private signal structure, could be easily introduced into
private signal structure by experience, personality, mental
status and other unknown endogenous and exogenous factors.
Thus Assumption 1 can significantly extend the application
scenario of non-Bayesian social learning model, especially in
describing the belief dynamics of human and animal social
networks.
C. Agent’s Information Sources
One key issue in agent i’s self-renewal process is about
its information sources, including what it knows and what
it doesn’t when a new time period t + 1 arrives: (a) As a
basic assumption of our research, agent i has no idea of the
world signal structure. (b) Since observations are independent,
agent i has no access to other agents’ even his neighbors’
signals. (c) Agent i forgets the history signals ωi,τ (τ ≤ t) it
observed and most of its history belief profiles µi,τ (τ < t),
which is referred to the imperfect recall principle in [15].
The information sources for the agent to update its belief
profile in period t + 1 include: (1) µi,t, its belief profile at
time t, (2) ωi,t+1, the signal observed at the beginning of the
new time period, and (3) µj,t(j ∈ Ni), its neighbors’ belief
profiles at time t. Each agent in each new time step uses these
information sources together with its private signal structure
to form its new belief report.
D. Learning Rules and Successful Learning
The updating of all agent’s beliefs over the network is
a dynamic process. Learning rule describes how an agent
uses its information sources to update its belief in a new
time step. In [16] it has been discussed that the order of
Bayesian updating and information aggregation makes little
difference. Therefore our model makes Bayesian updating first
and takes a weighted averaging information aggregation rule
in accordance with models in [6] and [18]. The weighted
averaging information aggregation rule is a DeGroot-style
rule satisfying monotonicity, label neutrality, and separability
mentioned in [15], it is a naive and the simplest way to
aggregate information from others.
In the non-Bayesian social learning model, agent i’s belief
updating formula can be written as
µi,t+1(θm) = aiiµi,t(θm)
`mi (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
+
∑
j∈Ni
aijµj,t(θm)
(1)
4for all θm ∈ Θ. For agent i, the first part on the right side
of Eq.(1) is the Bayesian part of the belief update, which is
a result of Bayesian inference based on the posterior belief in
period t, signal it observed in period t+ 1, and private signal
structure. The denominator
di,t(ωi,t+1) =
M∑
m=1
`mi (ωi,t+1)µi,t(θm)
is the one-step forecast, where aii is the weight referred to
the self-reliance. Additionally, the second part on the right
side of Eq.(1) is a weighted average of the beliefs held by its
neighbors, known as the social part. aij captures the weight
that agent i assigns to neighbor j, and it must satisfy that
aii +
∑
j∈Ni aij = 1.
If we use A = [aij ] to denote the network’s influence
matrix and use µt(θm) to denote a vector containing all agents’
beliefs on state θm at time t, then the belief dynamics of the
underlying network can be given by
µt+1(θm) =Aµt(θm) + diag
(
a11
[
`m1 (ω1,t+1)
d1,t(ω1,t+1)
− 1
]
,
a22
[
`m2 (ω2,t+1)
d2,t(ω2,t+1)
− 1
]
, · · · ,
aNN
[
`mN (ωN,t+1)
dN,t(ωN,t+1)
− 1
])
µt(θm)
(2)
for all θm ∈ Θ.
Specifically, if we assign the same self-reliance to all agents,
Eq.(1) can be rewritten as
µi,t+1(θm) = γµi,t(θm)
`mi (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
+
∑
j∈Ni
aijµj,t(θm)
(3)
for all θm ∈ Θ, where γ is the common self-reliance. We
note that Eq.(3) will be used to investigate learning speed in
Sub-section V-C.
Ulteriorly, if each agent assigns the same weight on its
neighbors’ beliefs, Eq.(3) can be rewritten as
µi,t+1(θm) = γµi,t(θm)
`mi (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
+
1− γ
|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni
µj,t(θm)
(4)
for all θm ∈ Θ. We note that Eq.(4) is used in all belief
dynamics simulations in this paper for simplicity.
We write 1x to denote a |Θ|-dimension vector with all zero
entries except for its x-th entry, which is equal to 1. If the
belief profile converges to 1r for every agent i in the network,
we say that the network could achieve successful learning,
which means all agents in the network could collectively and
eventually learn the real state of the objective world.
E. The Binary Case
Now let us consider the simplest case: Agent i possesses
a 2 × 2 private signal structure matrix, which means both of
state set Θ and signal space Si are binary. In this work, this
simplest case is called binary case for short. It should be noted
that all numerical simulations in this study are conducted in
the binary case, but all our propositions could generalize to
|Θ| ≥ 2 and |Si| ≥ 2 cases.
In the binary case, let the state set Θ = {θ1, θ2} and all
agents share the same signal set Si = {s1, s2}. We specify s1
is the high signal and s2 is the low signal [2], which means
gi(s1) > 1/2 and gi(s2) < 1/2. Let θ1 be the predefined real
state, `1i (s1) = α and `
2
i (s1) = β for all i, then the private
signal structure in the binary case can be defined by
Li =
[
α β
1− α 1− β
]
.
To some extent, the binary case is quite representative.
First, the binary case could cover most of the decision-making
scenarios, for state space and signal space of most decision-
making problems are binary. Second, as discussed in [18],
when the successful learning occurs, the learning process, in
the long run, is only related to the wrong state whose signal
structure has the minimum KL divergence to the real state,
which is referred to the most indistinguishable alternative
state. Besides, the mathematical merit of the binary signal
space is that the signal structure only has 2 degrees of freedom;
thus we could demonstrate the property of a signal structure
in the unit square α, β ∈ [0, 1], which is referred to αβ square
for short. In contrast, when |Θ| > 2 or |Si| > 2, visualization
of signal structure properties is far more complicated.
F. Main Question
In the case when each agent’s private signal structure is
perfect, which means `ri = g
T
i for all i, the authors in [6] give
the conditions enabling successful learning. Since our work is
an extension of [6], firstly, we need some of these successful
learning conditions to be our assumptions.
Assumption 2. All agents have strictly positive self-reliance,
which means aii > 0 for all i.
Assumption 2 ensures all agents’ signal structures act on
social learning. If aii = 0 for all i, the social network is a
dynamic system without signal input and Bayesian inference,
it will turn into a belief averaging network with naive learning
rule.
Assumption 3. There exists at least one agent i with a positive
initial belief on the real state θr, which means there exists at
least one agent i that satisfies µi,0(θr) > 0.
Assumption 3 is the necessary condition about agents’ initial
beliefs; without it, there will be no chance for agents in the
network to assign a positive belief on real state via Bayesian
inference.
With all the above three assumptions, the main question we
are going to answer is as follows:
Question 1. What are the private signal structure conditions
ensuring the successful learning over the network?
In the following section, we show that `ri , which is an
agent’s knowledge about the real state, plays a major role in
individual decision-making.
5IV. INDIVIDUAL LEARNING
First, we need to look at an agent’s intrinsic learning ability
by disregarding the social influence. Therefore the following
question should be answered first:
Question 2. Without the information from its neighbors, what
conditions could ensure an agent’s successful learning?
By answering this question, the private signal structure
properties that related to the long run result of repeated
Bayesian belief renewal will be explored.
A. Positive and Negative Signal Structures
For an isolated agent, due to lack of information from the
network, when a new time period t + 1 begins, its external
information source is only the newly arrived signal ωi,t+1. By
removing the social part from the right-hand side of Eq.(1)
and assigning aii = 1, the belief updating rule of an isolated
agent can be simplified as
µi,t+1(θm) = µi,t(θm)
`mi (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
(5)
for all θm ∈ Θ.
Before digging into the isolated agent’s repeated self-
renewal process described by Eq.(5), we introduce the defi-
nition of relative entropy (KL divergence) about two distribu-
tions.
Definition 1. Given two discrete probability distributions p, q
with identical supports, the relative entropy of q with respect
to p is
D(p||q) =
∑
j
pj log
pj
qj
.
With the above definition, for any state θm ∈ Θ, let
hi(gi, θm) = D(gi||`mi ),
then hi(gi, θm) could be used to measure the agent’s i’s
expected information content per observation in favor of the
hypothesis that the underlying state is θm. In addition, let
hgi (θm, θr) = hi(gi, θr)− hi(gi, θm)
=
∑
s∈Si
gi(s) log
`mi (s)
`ri (s)
,
(6)
then hgi (θm, θr) is a measure of the expected information
content per observation, in favor of (the hypothesis that the
underlying state is) θr other than θm. Notice that h
g
i (θm, θr) =
−hgi (θr, θm).
In Fig.1, entropies and relative entropies are vectorized
hgi (θm, θr) into the unit circle
1. Fig.1 illustrates the relation-
ship between hgi (θm, θr) and hi(θm, θr): h
g
i (θm, θr) could
be understood as the ”projection” of hi(θm, θr) onto the
entropy of world signal structure h(gi). If h
g
i (θm, θr) has the
same direction with h(gi), h
g
i (θm, θr) is positive; otherwise,
hgi (θm, θr) is negative.
1Generally speaking, vectorization of entropies and relative entropies into
the unit circle is of no meaning; Fig.1 provides a way to understand the
meaning of hgi (θm, θr) from the vector space perspective.
Fig. 1. hgi (θm, θr) could be understood as the ”projection” of hi(θm, θr)
onto the entropy of world signal structure h(gi).
With the definition of hgi (θm, θr), the condition that an
isolated agent should satisfy to achieve successful learning
by learning rule Eq.(5) is presented in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Suppose that agent i has a positive initial belief
on state θr, and its private signal structure Li satisfies
hgi (θm, θr) < 0 (7)
for all m 6= r, then, agent i learns the state θr, in probability,
by the belief updating rule given by Eq.(5), which means
µi,t
p−−−→
t→∞ 1r.
Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 1 reveals that, by repeated signal observation
and application of the Bayesian inference, an agent can learn
the underlying state if the underlying state’s corresponding
column `ri (in its private signal structure) has the minimum
KL divergence from the world signal structure. In other words,
the isolated agent will learn the state whose corresponding
column best describes the observed signals. A similar case is
also mentioned in Section 5.3.1 in [29].
The bold words ”in probability” in Proposition 1 indicates
the type of convergence. In particular, Eq.(7) ensures a weak
convergence. Another point to note is that if hgi (θm, θr) > 0
for some m 6= r, there must exist an r′ 6= r where
hgi (θm′ , θr′) < 0 for all m
′ 6= r′. That is to say, an agent must
learn a state, no matter whether the state is the underlying
state or not.
Then we have the definitions of positive and negative signal
structure:
Definition 2. Agent i and its private signal structure Li are
a) positive if hgi (θm, θr) < 0 for all m 6= r.
b) negative if there exists mˆ(mˆ 6= r) such that hgi (θmˆ, θr) >
0.
For a specific agent, in its signal structure, if the column
concerning the real state has the minimum KL divergence
to the world signal structure, it is positive. Otherwise, if
the column with the minimum KL divergence to the world
signal structure is not the r-th column, it is negative. For
individual learning, positive agents could learn the real state
6Fig. 2. hgi (`
2
i , `
1
i ) in αβ square, gi = [0.8, 0.2]. The two blue parts satisfy
the condition in Eq.(7) and belong to the positive signal structure region; the
two red parts belong to the negative signal structure region.
independently, while isolated negative agents always learn a
wrong state.
In [6], the authors mention an observational equivalent
concept: If there exists a state θm(m 6= r) with `m = `r,
then θr and θm are observational equivalent for agent i. Under
Assumption 1, the observational equivalent concept also needs
to be further extended. That is because `mi = `
r
i is not the only
solution for equation hgi (θm, θr) = 0; instead, all the solutions
of hgi (θm, θr) = 0 would cause the observational equivalent
problem.
Observational equivalent problem is an extreme case and
could be easily eliminated by social collaboration. Therefore,
if not mentioned particularly, this article will not discuss the
observational equivalent case, that means Definition 2 and
the following definitions and propositions will not cover the
special case that hgi (θm, θr) = 0 for some m 6= r.
In the binary case, since θ1 is the real state, m = 2 is the
only case for m 6= r. Thus if hgi (θ2, θ1) < 0, the agent and
its signal structure are positive, while if hgi (θ2, θ1) > 0, the
agent and its signal structure are negative. To clarify positive
and negative signal structures, hgi (θ2, θ1) in αβ square when
gi = [0.8, 0.2] is plotted in color map Fig.2.
Since hgi (`
m
i , `
r
i ) = −hgi (`ri , `mi ), color map of hgi (`mi , `ri )
is antisymmetric about the axis α = β. Each of positive
region and negative region covers 1/2 area of the square and
consists of a major part and a minor part. The four parts
are divided by two observational equivalent lines, one is the
straight line α = β, and the other is the curve line connecting
point (0, 1) and point (1, 0) which passes through the point
(0.8, 0.8). These two lines are perpendicular to each other at
point (0.8, 0.8), and they are the solution of hgi (θm, θr) = 0,
which means signal structures on these two lines may cause the
observational equivalent problem. The world signal structure
α = 0.8 passes through the two part of the positive region.
Positive and negative signal structures could also be ex-
plained by Fig.1: For a specific signal structure, if hgi (θm, θr)
has the opposite direction with h(gi) for all m 6= r, the
signal structure is positive, or else it is negative. Positive signal
structure means negative hgi (θm, θr), which also indicates that
h(`ri ) and h(gi) are closer than h(`
m
i ) and h(gi).
B. Conservative and Radical Signal Structures
While Eq.(7) ensures a weak (in probability thus in distri-
bution) convergence, our results show signal structures with
stronger conditions could ensure a stronger convergence via
learning rule described by Eq.(5).
Proposition 2. Suppose that agent i has positive initial
belief on state θr, and the private signal structure property
kgi (θm, θr) defined by
kgi (θm, θr) = log
∑
s∈Si
gi(s)
`mi (s)
`ri (s)
(8)
satisfies
kgi (θm, θr) < 0 (9)
for all m 6= r, then, agent i learns the state θr, almost
surely, by the learning rule described in Eq.(5), which means
µi,t
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 1r.
Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 2 is the almost sure convergence version of
Proposition 1. Since almost sure convergence indicates conver-
gence in probability, the condition in Eq.(9) is stronger than the
condition in Eq.(7). More specifically, with Eq.(6), Eq.(8), and
convexity of the logarithmic function, by Jenson’s inequality,
we have
log
∑
s∈Si
gi(s)
`mi (s)
`ri (s)
>
∑
s∈Si
gi(s) log
`mi (s)
`ri (s)
,
which indicates Eq.(9) is stronger than Eq.(7).
We must emphasize that Proposition 1 and Proposition 2
answer Question 2 in different senses: Proposition 1 converg-
ing in probability and Proposition 2 converging almost surely.
These two types of convergence play an important role in our
following definitions and propositions.
By Proposition 2 positive agents could be classified into two
types, we name them conservative and radical.
Definition 3. Positive agent and its private signal structure
Li are
a) conservative if kgi (θm, θr) < 0 for all m 6= r.
b) radical if there exists mˆ(mˆ 6= r) such that kgi (θmˆ, θr) >
0.
Fig.3 is the color map of kgi (θ2, θ1) in the binary case
(gi = [0.8, 0.2]), which shows that the conservative region is
between two intersecting lines. One of these two lines is still
the line α = β, part of the boundary of positive and negative
regions; the other line is α = 0.8, the junction between
conservative and radical regions. Notice that the perfect signal
structures (with `ri = g
T
i ) are right at the junction between
radical and conservative regions; this means that if an agent
has the perfect world signal structure, its signal structure is
neither conservative nor radical.
Fig.4 marks conservative, radical and negative signal struc-
tures in αβ square with 625 sample points. The positive region
is divided into conservative and radical regions by line α =
7Fig. 3. kgi (`
2
i , `
1
i ) in αβ square, gi = [0.8, 0.2]. The two green parts satisfy
the condition in Eq.(9) and belong to the conservative region.
(a) gi = (0.8, 0.2). (b) gi = (0.6, 0.4).
Fig. 4. Conservative(green), radical(blue) and negative(red) region in αβ
square with 25 × 25 sample points from (0.02, 0.02) to (0.98, 0.98), with
different gi and informativeness of world signal structure. Especially, Fig.4a
could be recognized as a qualitative combination of Fig.2 and Fig.3.
gi(s1). By comparing the case when gi = [0.8, 0.2] (Fig.4a,
higher h(gi) means world signals are more informative) with
the case when gi = [0.6, 0.4] (Fig.4b, lower h(gi) means world
signals are less informative), it could be noticed that the radical
region (blue) is fatter when the world signal structure is less
informative, which usually lead to a greater opportunity for an
agent’s signal structure to locate in the radical region.
Since `ri 6= gTi , both conservative and radical agents would
not rule out the wrong states as much as the informativeness
of the signal accordingly. Specifically, for most of the cases,
agents tend to accept the real state when a high signal is
observed (α > β); therefore, the conservative agents always
underestimate the informativeness of high signals (the major
green part in Fig.4), while radical agents always overestimate
the informativeness of high signals (the major blue part in
Fig.4). However, if agents tend to reject the real state when
a high signal is observed (α < β), conservative agents
always overestimate the informativeness of high signal (the
minor green part in and Fig.4), while radical agents always
underestimate the informativeness of high signal (the minor
blue part in Fig.4).
Semantically, conservative means be more cautious and less
arbitrary in decision-making. The reason why we use the
word conservative is that the line α = β is closer to the
conservative region than to the radical region, which means,
for conservative agents, knowledge difference between real
state and wrong states is less than that of radical agents. It
enables more fault tolerance for conservative agents to make
decisions.
V. SOCIAL LEARNING
Now let us switch back to the network context, where
the learning rule is represented by Eq.(1). To guarantee that
information can flow from an arbitrary agent in the network
to others, we first assume the connectivity of the network in
our work.
Assumption 4. The underlying social network is strongly
connected.
This connectivity assumption together with Assumption 3
make sure that all agents have strictly positive belief on real
state after finite time steps. The mathematical merit of strong
connectivity is that it guarantees that the influence matrix A
of the underlying network is irreducible.
A. Social Learning of Conservative Agents
In a strongly connected network, our results show the social
learning version of Proposition 2 holds, which is also the
answer to Question 1.
Proposition 3. Suppose that all agents’ private signal struc-
tures are conservative and follow the learning rule described
in Eq.(1), then all agents in the social network learn the real
state of the world almost surely, that is, µi,t
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 1r for all
i.
Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 3 gives sufficient conditions for a network to
achieve asymptotic learning: Distributed almost sure conver-
gence could lead to the almost sure convergence over a net-
work via non-Bayesian social learning. Group of conservative
individuals could reach consensus and learn the real state
collectively without knowing the accurate signal knowledge
about the real state. Underestimating or overestimating the
informativeness of high or low signal will not ruin the learning
of network, for conservative agents could always accumulate
correct information over time.
Compared with the asymptotic learning conditions given
in [6], the condition that no other state is observationally
equivalent to the real state from all agents is no longer needed.
The reason for this is that conservative condition in Proposition
3 is different from and slightly stronger than the globally
identifiable condition given in [6] to adapt our extended
model Assumption 1. All agents’ private signal structures are
conservative means that no state is observational equivalent to
the real state from the view of each agent. The real state is
locally identifiable, which implies that the real state is globally
identifiable.
In the binary case, we set up our simulation environment
using static undirected ER random network, in which all agents
share the same signal space and same world signal structure,
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CONSTANT SIGNAL STRUCTURES USED IN SIMULATIONS.
type α β hgi (θm, θr) k
g
i (θm, θr)
L(1) Conservative 0.6 0.4 −0.2433 −0.1823
L(2) Radical 0.9 0.1 −1.3183 0.6360
L(3) Negative 0.4 0.6 0.2433 0.2877
(a) γ = 0.1.
(b) γ = 0.9.
Fig. 5. Belief dynamics of ER random network composed of 100 conservative
agents (all agents are with L(1)). Each green line represents an agent’s
belief dynamics. With different self-reliances, conservative agents could reach
consensus and convergence at different speeds respectively.
which means gi = gj and Si = Sj for any i 6= j. In a
network of 100 nodes, we set the density of network to 0.1
and ensure its strong connectivity. Learning rule in Eq.(4) is
adopted, which means that all agents share the same self-
reliance γ and each agent assigns the same weight to all its
neighbors when performing information aggregation. Agents’
initial beliefs assigned to θ1 and θ2 are uniformly distributed
in the interval of [0, 1]. We assume that θ1 is the real state,
signal s1 appears with the possibility of 80%, and s2 with
20%, thus, gi = [0.8, 0.2] for all i.
To examine the learning process of a network composed of
conservative agents, we set all agents’ signal structure L(1) in
Table.I. The learning process of the network in 500 steps is
shown in Fig.5.
Fig.5 is the direct demonstration of Proposition 3. The green
lines, which is in accordance with the color of the conservative
region in Fig.4a, represent agents’ belief dynamics on the real
state over the time axis. All green lines and average belief are
approximating 1, which means the conservative agents could
collectively learn the underlying state. In general, while lower
self-reliance results in faster consensus (see Fig.5a), higher
self-reliance results in faster convergence (see Fig.5b).
B. Social Learning of Radical Agents
Proposition 3 is the social version of Proposition 2; to
some extent, its convergence is predictable. Also, it is easy to
(a) γ = 0.1.
(b) γ = 0.9.
Fig. 6. Belief dynamics of ER random network composed of 100 radical
agents (all agents are with L(2)). Whenever the common self-reliance is high
or low, radical agents could not learn the real state collectively and completely.
infer that negative agents always do harm to social learning.
In this sub-section, we will focus on the racial agents; a
counter-intuitive phenomenon will be shown: Social version of
Proposition 1 does not hold, which means network composed
of radical agents could not achieve successful learning.
Proposition 4. Suppose that all agents’ private signal struc-
tures are radical and follow the learning rule described in
Eq.(1), then all agents remain uncertain almost surely.
Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 4 reveals that distributed convergence in proba-
bility could not ensure a collective convergence. If all agents
are with radical signal structure L(2) in Table.I, in the same
simulation environment, the learning process of 100-nodes
network is shown in Fig.6. It could be found that although the
network has no chance to learn a wrong state, the learning re-
sult may remain uncertain. That is somewhat counter-intuitive
because all radical agents could perform success learning
independently. This counter-intuitiveness can be viewed as
a kind of information cascades [7], [22], [30]: Neighbors’
misleading observations are overestimated or underestimated
by themselves before involving in each agent’s subsequent
decision-making. For each radical agent, it can not completely
rule out these misleading information by the accumulation of
new observations.
Particularly, in Fig.6, when learning with lower self-
reliance, the agents reach a noisy consensus (see Fig.6a).
In addition, learning with higher common self-reliance is an
approximation to the individual learning case; thus agents’
average belief on the real state keeps at a high value after
about 300 steps (see Fig.6b). However, higher common self-
reliance prevents the network from consensus. In Fig.6b, it
can be seen that there are always a few numbers of agents in
network assign low beliefs on real state after 100 steps.
9What’s interesting is that in [17] the results show that if
each agent uses a log-linear information aggregation rule,
then radical agents could learn the real state collectively. That
means radical agents could avoid information cascades by
taking a more rational information aggregation approach.
C. Learning speed
In this part, we will discuss the learning speed under the
model Assumption 1. As a parameter describing the learning
process, Learning speed represents how fast agents’ beliefs
converge to 1r. Learning rate discussed in [18] is used to
measure the learning speed of a network. Here we introduce
the definitions of belief uncertainty and learning rate in [18].
Definition 4. Belief uncertainty of a network at time t is given
by
et =
1
2
n∑
i=1
||µi,t − 1r||1, (10)
and learning rate is defined by
λ = lim inf
t→∞
1
t
| log et|.
With the above definitions of belief uncertainty and learning
rate, our proposition about learning speed is as follows:
Proposition 5. Suppose all agents in the network are conser-
vative and share the same self-reliance γ, which means the
learning rule is described by Eq.(3), then the learning rate
λ ≤ γ min
m 6=r
n∑
i=1
vi|kgi (θm, θr)|
almost surely.
Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 5 needs to be discussed when the network sat-
isfies the conditions of Proposition 3; otherwise, the existence
of radical and negative agents might ruin social learning.
Compared with Proposition 2 in [18], the relative entropy
hi(gi, θm) is replaced by |kgi (θm, θr)| in our Proposition 5.
Since we have
0 < −kgi (θm, θr) < −hgi (θm, θr) < hi(gi, θm),
conservative agents ensure successful learning by lowering the
learning rate.
In the same simulation environment (connected network
with 100 nodes and density 0.1), fix γ = 0.5, for each conser-
vative signal structure point L(α,β) in Fig.4a, set Li = L(α,β)
for all node i in network, after 50 steps’ learning, fill the
value of | log(e50)(α,β)| back into the αβ square, then the
relationship between signal structure and belief uncertainty is
shown in Fig.7.
By comparing Fig.3 with Fig.7, it could be noticed that
green points in Fig.7 and green part of Fig.3 are similar, which
indicates that there is a close relationship between |kgi (θ2, θ1)|
and learning speed.
In addition, Fig.8 plots |kgi (θ2, θ1)| of each conserva-
tive signal structure L(α,β) in Fig.7 and the corresponding
| log(e50)(k)| together. To some extent, it appears a linear
Fig. 7. Relationship between conservative signal structure L(α,β) and belief
uncertainty | log(e50)(α,β)|. Value of each point (α, β) in this colormap
represents | log(e50)(α,β)| of a network composed of agents whose signal
structures are all L(α,β).
Fig. 8. Relationship between |kgi (θ2, θ1)| of conservative signal struc-
ture L(α,β) and | log(e50)(k)|. The x-coordinate of each point is the
|kgi (θ2, θ1)| value of each point in Fig.7, and y-coordinate is the correspond-
ing | log(e50)(k)|. It appears an approximately linear relationship between
|kgi (θ2, θ1)| and | log(e50)(k)|.
relationship between |kgi (θ2, θ1)| and | log(e50)(k)|. That is
to say, when other conditions such as self-reliance level
remain unchanged, the relationship between learning speed of
network and level of |kgi (θmˆ, θr)| among agents approximates
to linear, where the θmˆ denotes the most indistinguishable
alternative state from the view of the whole network. This
linear relationship is an indirect demonstration of Proposition
5.
VI. CONSIDERATION IN ACTUAL SOCIAL PRACTICES
In this section, we first propose some fragilities of non-
Bayesian social learning model from a mathematical perspec-
tive. Then we show the benefits that negative agents can
acquire from social learning. At last, two adjusting strategies
and three decision-making patterns are summarized to explain
the collective decision-making mechanism in actual social
practices from mathematical and social perspective respec-
tively.
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A. Fragilities in Non-Bayesian Social Learning
Based on mathematical results in Section IV and Section
V, the fragilities of social learning mechanism are mainly
reflected in the three following aspects:
a). The collective decision-making cannot improve learning
speed, for higher social-reliance (lower self-reliance) usually
results in lower learning speed. Particularly, for conservative
agents and agents with perfect signal structures, social learning
is slower than individual learning.
b). Successful individual learning could not ensure success-
ful social learning, for the existence of radical agents might
ruin the successful learning over the network.
c). Agents with perfect signal structure are right at the
junction of the conservative region and the radical region in
αβ square (see Fig.4), which makes these agents easy to turn
radical when endogenous noise is introduced into their private
signal structure.
B. Negative agents in Social Learning
Since fragilities exist in non-Bayesian social learning model,
why individuals tend to learn from their neighbors by joining
the network in actual social practices? One explanation we can
find within the frame of non-Bayesian social learning model
is that, by calling the individuals together, the network may
provide more opportunities for negative agents to learn the real
state with the help of their conservative neighbors.
Fig.9 shows the learning process of a network composed of
90 conservative agents (with L(1) in Table I) and 10 radical
agents (with L(3) in Table I) in three different self-reliance val-
ues γ. When common γ shifts from 0.1 to 0.5, the overwhelm-
ing conservative agents can help the negative agents to learn
the real state (see Fig.9a,9b). Particularly, as the γ increases,
the learning speed of the network increases. However, if the
γ is high enough, the network remains uncertain (see Fig.9c).
In such a case, high self-reliance lead to overconfidence, and
when the overconfidence of negative agents occurs, limited
help could be obtained from conservative agents, which further
results in a failed learning.
C. Adjustment Strategies
Negative agents can get benefits from conservative neigh-
bors in social learning; however, insufficient arguments are
given to explain why the conservative and radical agents have
motivations to join social learning.
In fact, all three types of agents might exist in the actual
social network. For each agent, as it does not know the world
signal structure, it is also unaware of its private signal structure
type. However, we find that, although the private signal
structure type is unknown to each agent, it would be much
easier for the entire network to achieve successful learning if
its agents could adjust their private signal structure and self-
reliance via some appropriate strategies. These strategies for
each agent include:
a). Be more conservative. Mathematically, ”be more conser-
vative” means each agent should try to reduce the difference
between the two signal structure columns which point to
(a) γ = 0.1.
(b) γ = 0.5.
(c) γ = 0.9.
Fig. 9. Belief dynamics of ER random network composed of 90 conservative
agents (with L(1), green) and 10 negative agents (with L(3), red) at different
self-reliances γ. Higher γ means faster learning (Fig.9b) but might result in
overconfidence (Fig.9c).
the two most possible states (in actual social practice, these
two states are very likely to be the real state and the most
indistinguishable alternative state), especially when the KL
divergences between its belief and neighbors’ beliefs are
too large. By doing this, both radical and negative agents’
signal structures would have smaller kgi (θm, θr) on the most
indistinguishable alternative state θm (in the binary case, it
is closer to α = β). That is beneficial to both radical and
negative agents: Radical agents might have an opportunity to
become a conservative agent, and negative agents would be
more likely to be persuaded by their conservative neighbors.
b). Avoid overconfidence. In the non-Bayesian social learn-
ing model, the physical meaning of self-reliance is the self-
confidence. Therefore, ”avoid overconfidence” means an agent
should assign enough weights to their neighbors’ beliefs. By
doing this, adequate and effective support to a negative agent
could be provided by its conservative neighbors. As a result,
the collaborative tightness of agents in a social network could
improve the learning over the network. This strategy might
slow down the learning speed, but it is beneficial to the long
run learning result.
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D. Social Members’ Decision-Making Patterns
Above two strategies are based on our propositions, simu-
lations, and inferences. To extend the implementation value of
these two strategies from the perspective of actual social prac-
tices, we conclude three following decision-making patterns of
social members:
Pattern A: Confident and Perfect/Radical. This pattern
matches the radical agents and agents with perfect signal
structure. Social members with accurate knowledge (perfect
signal structure) and those who dare to overestimate the
informativeness of high signals (radical) usually keep strong
self-confidence (high self-reliance) in actual social practice.
As a form of social communication, they often neglect others’
opinions (low social-reliances).
Pattern B: Cooperative and Conservative. This pattern
matches the conservative agents. Individuals with inaccurate
or inadequate knowledge (imperfect signal structure) usually
make decisions cautiously (conservatively) and communicate
more with their neighbors (high social-reliances).
Pattern C: Dependent and Negative. This pattern matches
the negative agents. Individuals tend to be suspicious about
its knowledge (signal structure) whenever others’ opinions
have great difference (great KL divergences) to its own. In
other words, to negative agents, social pressure might result
in weak self-confidence and knowledge suspicion. Therefore,
spontaneous adjustments would further be taken to fill gaps
between their and their neighbors’ beliefs.
Above three decision-making patterns are consistent with
our mathematical results and analyses. Furthermore, several
canonical theoretical and empirical studies in the area of social
science, such as self-efficacy [31], social pressure [32], subjec-
tive norms [33], and leadership [34] also provide observation
and explanation on these decision-making patterns in the real
society. More importantly, these patterns might be the essen-
tial components of collective decision-making in human and
animal societies, specialized in bringing individual together,
ensuring the robustness of the social network, enabling as
many individuals as possible to survive each critical moment
in both history and future.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, under the imperfect private signal structure
assumption, agents in the social network are classified into
three types: ”conservative,” ”radical,” and ”negative”. The con-
servative agents always push a network to the correct decision,
while both negative and radical agents are detrimental to the
learning of the network. A network contains negative and/or
radical agents may not be able to learn the real state of the
world. If conservative agents are overwhelming in a network,
they could help the rest agents in learning the real state, thus
making social learning more robust than individual learning.
If each member could adjust its signal structure and self-
reliance with appropriate strategies, it would be easier for the
network to learn the real state synchronically. In summary,
the non-Bayesian social learning model is mathematically
fragile and practically effective. The assumption of imperfect
private signal structure, along with adjusting strategies and
decision-making patterns we summarized could better reflect
the learning mechanism of human and animal societies.
This paper studies the learning abilities of different signal
structures mathematically. Most of the discussion is based
on mathematical propositions and simulations, the details in
decision-making patterns need to be verified empirically, and
some model errors such as learning rule error are not fully
taken into account. Thus, model extension researches such as
the influence of different learning rules, the performance of
different strategies, and empirical researches about decision-
making patterns could be included in future works.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
First, we give proof of Proposition 1. Then follows three
auxiliary lemmas for a specific agent, which are used to prove
Propositions 2 and 3. After that, proof of Proposition 4 is
given by contradiction. The proof of Proposition 5 is given in
the last sub-section. Proofs of some lemmas and propositions
follow similar approaches as those in [6] and [18].
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. By evaluating the ratio of belief on any alternative state
to the real state, we have
µi,t(θm)
µi,t(θr)
=
µi,0(θm)
µi,0(θr)
t∏
tˆ=1
`mi (ωi,tˆ)
`ri (ωi,tˆ)
=
µi,0(θm)
µi,0(θr)
N∏
n=1
(
`mi (sn)
`ri (sn)
)zn
,
in which zn denote the signal sn appeared zn times in t steps.
Let random variable sequence Xmt = µi,t(θm)/µi,t(θr) and
 > 0, consider
P (|Xmt | ≥ ) = P
(
µi,0(θm)
µi,0(θr)
N∏
n=1
(
`mi (sn)
`ri (sn)
)zn
≥ 
)
= P
(
N∑
n=1
zn log
`mi (sn)
`ri (sn)
≥ log µi,0(θr)
µi,0(θm)
)
,
since zn
p−−−→
t→∞ tgi(sn),
lim
t→∞P (|X
m
t | ≥ )
= lim
t→∞P
(
N∑
n=1
tgi(sn) log
`mi (sn)
`ri (sn)
≥ log µi,0(θr)
µi,0(θm)
)
,
then with Eq.(7), we have limt→∞ P (|Xmt | ≥ ) = 0 for any
m 6= r, which indicates that µi,t p−−−→
t→∞ 1r.
B. Auxiliary lemmas for specific agent
Lemma 1. For any agent i’s private signal structure satis-
fies Eq.(9), we have E [`ri (ωi,t+1)/di,t(ωi,t+1)| Ft] > 1 for
arbitrary prior belief µi,t.
Proof. The condition in Eq.(9), which is∑
s∈Si
gi(s)
`mi (s)
`ri (s)
< 1
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for m 6= r, means for arbitrary µi,t we have
gi
[
diag−1[`ri ]`
1
i , diag
−1[`ri ]`
2
i , · · ·
]
µi,t < 1,
where the left side
gi
[
diag−1[`ri ]`
1
i , diag
−1[`ri ]`
2
i , · · ·
]
µi,t
=
∑
s∈Si
gi(s)
di,t(s)
`ri (s)
=E
[
di,t(ωt+1)
`ri (ωt+1)
∣∣∣∣Ft] .
Since f(x) = 1/x is a convex function, Jensen’s inequality
implies that
E
[
`ri (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
∣∣∣∣Ft] ≥ (E [ di,t(ωi,t+1)`ri (ωi,t+1)
∣∣∣∣Ft])−1,
which leads to
E
[
`ri (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
∣∣∣∣Ft] ≥ 1.
Lemma 2. If we have E [`ri (ωi,t+1)/di,t(ωi,t+1)| Ft]→ 1 for
agent i, then we have di,t(s)
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ `
r
i (s) for all possible
signal s ∈ Si.
Proof. Note that both `ri and di,t are probability measures on
Si, and we have∑
s∈Si
`ri (s) =
∑
s∈Si
di,t(s) = 1.
Consider
E
[
`ri (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ω,it+1)
∣∣∣∣Ft]− 1
=
∑
s∈Si
gi(s)
`mi (s)− di,t(s)
di,t(s)
+
∑
s∈Si
`ri (s)−
∑
s∈Si
di,t(s)
=
∑
s∈Si
[gi(s) + di,t(s)][`
r
i (s)− di,t(s)]
di,t(s)
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 0.
Now we have∑
s∈Si
gi(s)
`ri (s)− di,t(s)
di,t(s)
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 0,
and at the same time we have∑
s∈Si
[gi(s) + di,t(s)][`
s
i (s)− di,t(s)]
di,t(s)
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 0,
that means for arbitrary c,∑
s∈Si
[cgi(s) + di,t(s)][`
r
i (s)− di,t(s)]
di,t(s)
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 0. (11)
Because di,t(s) is positive for all s ∈ Si, Equation set Eq.(11)
only has zero solution, thus we have di,t(s)
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ `
r
i (s) for
all possible signals s ∈ Si.
Lemma 3. For any agent i’s private signal structure Li
satisfying Eq.(9), if we have di,t(s)
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ `
r
i (s) for all
possible signal s ∈ Si, then µi,t a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 1r.
Proof. The Bayesian part of the update is distribution over set
Θ means
M∑
m=1
µi,t(θm)
`mi (s)
di,t(s)
=
∑
m6=r
µi,t(θm)
`mi (s)
di,t(s)
+ µi,t(θr)
`ri (s)
di,t(s)
=1.
With condition di,t(s)
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ `
r
i (s) for all s ∈ Si, we have∑
m 6=r
µi,t(θm)
`mi (s)
di,t(s)
+ µi,t(θr)
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 1,
leading to∑
m 6=r
µi,t(θm)
`mi (s)
di,t(s)
− (1− µi,t(θr)) a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 0.
Because µi,t ∈ ∆Θ, we have µi,t(θr) = 1−
∑
m6=r µi,t(θm),
thus ∑
m 6=r
µi,t(θm)
(
1− `
m
i (s)
`ri (s)
)
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 0, (12)
for s ∈ Si. Note that in Eq.(9), gi ∈ ∆Si, means∑
s∈Si gi(s) = 1, which leads to∑
s∈Si
gi(s)
(
1− `
m
i (s)
`ri (s)
)
> 0, . (13)
for m = 1, 2, · · ·M , m 6= r.
Now, let Li be a |Si|× |Θ| matrix of which the entry at the
x-th row and y-th column is 1 − `yi (sx)/`ri (sx), and entries
of r-th column are zero, then Eq.(12) and Eq.(13) could be
merged into
Liµi,t a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 0 (14)
and
[giLi]m > 0, for all m 6= r.
Let an m−entry error vector ε satisfies
εm =
{
[giLi]m m 6= r
0 m = r
,
multiplying both sides of Eq.(14) by gi from left leads to
εµi,t
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 0, which means µi,t(θm)
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 0 for all m 6= r,
then we have µi,t
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 1r.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. For a specific agent i, evaluate Eq.(5) at the real state
θr,
µi,t+1(θr) = µi,t(θr)
`ri (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
,
thus
E [µi,t+1(θr)| Ft] = µi,t(θr)E
[
`ri (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
∣∣∣∣Ft] .
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Lemma 1 guarantees
E [µi,t+1(θr)| Ft]− µi,t(θr)
= µi,t(θr)
(
E
[
`i(
rωi,t+1|
di,t(ωi,t+1)
∣∣∣∣Ft]− 1) ≥ 0,
thus µi,t+1(θr) is a submartingale, and it converges almost
surely. Due to the fact that µi,t(θr) is non-negative, by the
dominated convergence theorem for conditional expectations,
we have
E
[
`ri (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
∣∣∣∣Ft] a.s.−−−→t→∞ 1,
then Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 guarantee µi,t
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 1r.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
We first introduce another lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose v is any non-negative left eigenvector of
the influence matrix A corresponding to its unit eigenvalue,
then vµt+1(θr) is a submartingale, it converges almost surely.
Proof. Evaluate Eq.(2) at the real state and multiply both sides
by v from the left, we have
vµt+1(θr) = vµt(θr)
+
N∑
i=1
viaiiµi,t(θr)
[
`ri (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
− 1
]
.
thus
E [vµt+1(θr)| Ft] = vµt(θr)
+
N∑
i=1
viaiiµi,t(θr)E
[
`ri (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
− 1
∣∣∣∣Ft]. (15)
Lemma 1 guarantees
E
[
`ri (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
− 1
∣∣∣∣Ft] ≥ 0.
Strongly connected topology ensures the influence matrix is
irreducible; thus, vi > 0 and µi,m(t) > 0 for all i ∈ N and
all θm ∈ Θ, the second part on the right of Eq.(15) is positive
which indicate vµt(θr) is a submartingale. Hence, it converges
almost surely.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider Eq.(2) together with the
conclusion from Lemma 4, we have
N∑
i=1
viaiiµi,t(θr)
[
`ri (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
− 1
]
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 0.
Therefore by the dominated convergence theorem for condi-
tional expectations,
N∑
i=1
viaiiµi,t(θr)
(
E
[
`ri (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
∣∣∣∣Ft]− 1) a.s.−−−→t→∞ 0.
Since aii > 0, entries of vT and µi,t(θk) are all strictly
positive, we have
E
[
`i(ωi,t+1|θk)
di,t(ω,it+1)
∣∣∣∣Ft] a.s.−−−→t→∞ 1,
then, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 guarantee µi,t
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ 1r for all
i ∈ N .
E. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We prove Proposition 4 by contradiction. If the network
could learn the real state, it must achieve consensus and
convergence. Therefore, we need to prove that when the
network reaches consensus, the network could not converge
to 1r.
If consensus occurs, members in the network would share
the same belief profile. Examine learning rule Eq.(1) at the
consensus status, Eq.(1) could be rewritten as:
µi,t+1(θm) = aiiµi,t(θm)
`mi (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
+ (1− aii)µi,t(θm)
for all m. Then we have
E[µi,t+1(θr)|Ft]− µi,t(θr)
= aiiµi,t(θr)
(∑
s
gi(s)
`ri (s)
di,t(s)
− 1
)
= aiiµi,t(θr)
(∑
s
gi(s)
`mi (s)∑
`mi (s)µi,t(θm)
− 1
)
.
(16)
Let µi,t(θr) = 1 − , µi,t(θmˆ) = , and µi,t(θm) = 0 for all
m 6= r, mˆ, then the items in brackets on the right side of (16)
is a function of  as following:
f() =
∑
s
gi(s)
1
1− +  `mˆi (s)`ri (s)
− 1,
moreover, its directive is
f ′() =
∑
s
gi(s)
1− `mˆi (s)
`mˆi (s)(
1− +  `mˆi (s)`ri (s)
)2 .
Evaluate f ′() at  = 0, we have
f ′(0) =
∑
s
gi(s)
(
1− `
mˆ
i (s)
`ri (s)
)
= 1−
∑
s
gi(s)
`mˆi (s)
`ri (s)
.
Since agent is radical, we have f ′(0) < 0, then together
with the fact f(0) = 0 and continuity of f(), there exists
an interval (0, c), c > 0 in which f() < 0. Thus, µi,t(θr)
is a supermartingale in the corresponding interval, which
contradict with µi,t(θr)
t→∞−−−→ 1.
F. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. For any m 6= r, taking logarithms of both sides of
Eq.(3) and using Jensen’s inequality implies
logµi,t+1(θm) ≥ γ log
(
`mi (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
)
+
n∑
j=1
aij logµj,t(θm)
Since vA = v, let xt(θm) =
∑n
i=1 vi logµi,t(θm), multiplying
both sides of the above inequality by vi and summing up over
i lead to
xt+1(θm)− xt(θm) ≥ qt(θm), (17)
where
qt(θm) = γ
n∑
i=1
vi log
(
`mi (ωi,t+1)
di,t(ωi,t+1)
)
.
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Then by summing up over t, Eq.(17) leads to
1
T
(xT (θm)− x0(θm)) ≥ 1
T
T−1∑
t=0
qt(θm). (18)
Lemma 2 indicates di,t(s)
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ `
r
i (s) for all s, hence
pt(θm) = γ
n∑
i=1
vi log
(
`mi (ωi,t+1)
`ri (ωi,t+1)
)
a.s.−−−→
t→∞ qt(θm).
Since limt→∞ 1tx0(θm) = 0, taking the limit of both sides of
Eq.(18) as t→∞ implies
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
xT (θm) ≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(qt(θm)− pt(θm))
+ lim
T→∞
T−1∑
t=0
pt(θm).
Given that qt(θm) − pt(θm) converges to zero almost surely,
the first term on the right-hand side of the above inequality
is equal to zero almost surely. Furthermore, by the strong law
of large numbers, the second term on the right-hand side is
equal to E[pt(θm)]. Therefore, we have
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
n∑
i=1
vi logµi,t(θm) ≥ E[pt(θm)]
=γ
n∑
i=1
vih
g
i (θm, θr).
(19)
By belief uncertainty definition Eq(10), we have
et =
n∑
i=1
∑
m6=r
µi,t(θm),
and as a result
log et ≥ log
(
max
m 6=r
max
i
µi,t(θm)
)
= max
m 6=r
max
i
logµi,t(θm)
≥max
m 6=r
n∑
i=1
vi logµi,t(θm).
Thus with Eq(19), for all m 6= r,
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
log et ≥ lim sup
t→∞
1
t
max
m6=r
n∑
i=1
vi logµi,t(θm)
≥γmax
m 6=r
n∑
i=1
vih
g
i (θm, θr)
≥γmax
m 6=r
n∑
i=1
vik
g
i (θm, θr).
almost surely, where the second inequality is a consequence
of Eq.(19). Consequently,
λ = lim inf
t→∞
1
t
| log et| ≤ γ min
m 6=r
n∑
i=1
vi|kgi (θm, θr)|
almost surely.
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